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by Tom Wheeler
The general thesis of this slim book is that due to the rise of the telegraph as a viable technology and the exigencies of war, Abraham Lincoln developed some of the very first principles of electronic leadership. He used the telegraph to inject himself into military decisions and to monitor the progress of the war in ways previously impossible, and with no precedent or guide he developed a new and effective style of communications.
An interesting thesis, in and of itself, which would have been much better suited by a journal article rather than a book. It’s not a bad book, exactly, it just shouldn’t have been one. Or, well, not one written by Wheeler – an actual historian would have filled the blank space with less partisan and biased analysis of military and political movements. But Wheeler did write it, and his history is biased and partisan, and lacking in any attempt at nuance or in depth awareness (he calls the Southern army the “rebels” throughout, which got under my skin far more than I expected). Rather dull, too. And the insights about electronic leadership weren’t anything I couldn’t have worked out for myself.
Ah well. Still a nice idea. Better journal article, though.
The general thesis of this slim book is that due to the rise of the telegraph as a viable technology and the exigencies of war, Abraham Lincoln developed some of the very first principles of electronic leadership. He used the telegraph to inject himself into military decisions and to monitor the progress of the war in ways previously impossible, and with no precedent or guide he developed a new and effective style of communications.
An interesting thesis, in and of itself, which would have been much better suited by a journal article rather than a book. It’s not a bad book, exactly, it just shouldn’t have been one. Or, well, not one written by Wheeler – an actual historian would have filled the blank space with less partisan and biased analysis of military and political movements. But Wheeler did write it, and his history is biased and partisan, and lacking in any attempt at nuance or in depth awareness (he calls the Southern army the “rebels” throughout, which got under my skin far more than I expected). Rather dull, too. And the insights about electronic leadership weren’t anything I couldn’t have worked out for myself.
Ah well. Still a nice idea. Better journal article, though.
